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1. SOVEREIGNTY AND THE INCIDENCE OF THE LAW
OF THE SEA ON TITLE TO AREAS AND RESOURCES
In recent years, the Polar Arctic has gained in interest for fishing
and for the exploitation of mineral resources. Equally important is
the strategic value that it has attained by virtue of progress in air
communications and, more especially, maritime navigation, which
is now possible both in difficult conditions on the surface and below
the surface. Although the disputes that have arisen in the Arctic are
currently well on the way to resolution, this changed context makes
it appropriate to re-examine the parameters with respect to which
such resolutions have been framed. Apart from its intrinsic interest,
such a reexamination appears to be indispensable both as a review
of the state of the question and as a necessary basis for analysis
of the possible outcomes of outstanding issues, which are also dis-
cussed below.
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1.1. THE ARCHIPELAGOOF SPITSBERGEN(SVALBARD)..
on February 9th 1920 in the Treaty on Spitsbergen (2). This Treaty
was concluded by the United States of America, the United Kingdom
of Great Britain and Ireland, Denmark, France, Italy, [apan, Norway,
the Netherlands and Sweden, but Art. 10 Para. 7 states that "Third
Powers will be invited by the Government of the French Republic
to adhere to the present Treaty duly ratified. This adhesion shall
be effected by a communication addressed to the French Govern-
ment, which will undertake to notify the other Contracting Parties".
Russia being a State directIy interested in the exploitation of Spitsbergen,
its interests were taken into account in Art. 10 Para. 1 of the Treaty:
"Until the recognition by the High Contracting Parties of a Russian
Government shall permit Russia to adhere to the present Treaty,
Russian nationals and companies shall enjoy the same rights as
nationals of the High Contracting Parties". In Art. 10 Para. 2 the
Danish government lent its good offices for the presentation of
claims by Russian nationals and companies. The Soviet government
nevertheless declared that it was not bound by a treaty it had had
no part in drafting. The Soviet government's position was in fact
linked to the problem of .its recognition; when in February 1924 it
was recognized de iure by the United Kingdom government, it declared
that it would recognize Norwegian sovereignty over Spitsbergen if
it itself was immediately recognized by Oslo. Once recognized de
iure by the Norwegian government, it did indeed recognize Norwe-
gian sovereignty ayer the archipelago, including Bear Island, in a
note dated February 16th 1 924. It was in 1934, after the de iure
recognition of the Soviet government by the United States, that the
Soviet Union was officially invited to adhere to the Treaty. Its
unreserved ratification by the Soviet Union took place on May 7th
1935. This strengthened the special status established for the archi-
pelago of Spitsbergen, which with the coming into force of the Treaty
on August 14th 1925 had been incorporated by Norway as a new
The Archipelago of Spitsbergen (in Norwegian) the Svalbard),
with a geographicalland area of about 61,229 km2, is approximately
located between latitude 76° 30' North and latitude 81° North. The
distance from the Southern Cape at the south of the main island
of Spitsbergen to the Northern Cape, the northernmost point of
Norwegian terra firma, is approximately 350 nautical miles. Almost
half way between continental Norway and the archipelago, approxi-
mately between latitud e 74° 10" North and latitude 74° 20" North,
is Bear Island (Beeren-Eiland). At a distance of about 220 nautical
miles from the Northern Cape, it is actually rather nearer the ar-
chipelago than the continent, a fact that may well have had a role
in its being legally considered, as in the Treaty on Spitsbergen (vide
infra), as part of the archipelago of Spitsbergen. Fleischer has pointed
out that the geographical position of the archipelago lends it not
only great political and strategic importance, but also great legal
interest. From the strategic point of view, the most important sea-
lane between the Soviet Union and the open sea lies between con-
tinental Norway and Spitsbergen. It should not be overlooked that,
of the Soviet Union's four main outlets to the sea, the other three
(via the Baltic Sea, the Black Sea and Vladivostok) suffer bottlenecks;
hence the importance of the "5valbard passage" for the Soviet Union (1).
The archipelago of Spitsbergen long lacked legal status, to the
extent that in an exchange of letters among 5weden, Norway and
Russia in 1872 it was recognized as terra nullius (which did not,
however, prevent the existence of private rights, which were rec-
ognized in Art. 6 of the Treaty on Spitsbergen). At the beginning
of the 17th century, the Arctic in general was the scene of dispute
among English, Dutch, Danish and Hamburguese fishermen, and in
1871-2 and 1907-8 Norway tried in vain to raise the question of its
status - and more particularly the status ofSpitsbergen in official
international circles. In 1914 the problem of Spitsbergen was dis-
cussed at the Oslo Conference, where a draft convention was worked
out by Norway, Sweden and Russia, the parties with the greatest
interest in this region. The matter was taken up again after World
War 1at the Versailles Peace Conference, and was concluded at Paris
(2) The Spitsbergen Treaty can be consulted in, among other sources, THEUTENBERC, B.j.: Tire
Evo/I/tioll 01 tire Law 01 the Sea: A Study 01 Resources and Strategy wit)¡ Specia/ Regard to the Polar Regiolls,
Dublin, 1984, pp.237-239.; VAN OER ESSEN, A.: "L'Econornie des régimes polaires. Realisations et per-
spectives", Crollique de Politique Etrallgére, voI.XXV,nom.4, Juillet 1972,pp.478-484; Leagl/e 01Na/iolls Treaty
Series 1920-1921, vol.Il, 1, p.8; Recueil des Traites de la Norvége, vol.II, p.988; OverellsKomster med fremela
Norvege. vol. 11,p. 988; OverellsKomster med jreme de stater, 1925, p. 551; Norges Laver 1685-1973.The English
and French texts are both authoritative. In Castilian, the Treaty may be consulted in La Gaceta de Madrid.
núm. 103, 13 de abril de 1929, págs. 228-230. For an account 01 the changing situation 01 the archipelago
between the 16th century and 1920,see OOLLOT, R.: "Le Oroit lnternational des espaces polaires", Recl/eil
des Cours, t. 75, 1949, 11,pp. 144-155.(]) FLElSCHER, C.A.: "The question 01 earlier Treaty rights applied to new maritime zoncs;
Spitsbergcn and the Law 01 the Sea", /ralliall Review oi hüematíono! Re/atiolls. vol.Ll-TZ, Spring'1978, p.246.
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province. At present some forty States are bound by the Treaty(3).
According to Art. 1, the contracting parties undertake to rec-
ognize, subject to the stipulations of the Treaty, "the fuIl and absolute
sovereignty of Norway over the Archipelago of Spitsbergen, com-
prising, with Bear Island or BeerenEiland, all the islands situated
between 10° and 35° longitude East of Greenwich and) between 74°
and 81° latitud e North, especiaIly West Spitsbergen, North-East Land,
Barents Island, Edge Island, Wiche Islands, Hope Island or HopenEiland,
and Prince Charles Foreland, together with aIl islands great or smaIl
and rocks appertaining thereto". The limitations to which the Treaty
subjects the fuIl and absolute sovereignty of Norway over the Ar-
chipelago include the provision that "Ships and nationals of all the
High Contracting Parties shaIl enjoy equaIly the rights of fishing and
hunting in the territories specified in Article 1 and in their territorial
waters", though "Norway shaIl be free to maintain, take or decree
suitable measures to ensure the preservation and, if necessary, the
reconstitution of the fauna and flora of the said regions, and their
territorial waters; it being clearly understood that these measures
shaIl always be applicable equaIly to the nationals of all the High
Contracting Parties without any exemption, privilege or favour
whatsoever, direct or indirect, to the advantage of any one of them"
(Art, 2). Similarly (Art. 3, Paras. 1-3), The nationals of all the High
Contracting Parties shaIl have equal liberty of access and entry for
any reason or object whatever to the waters, fjords and ports of the
territories specified in Artide 1; subject to theobservance of local.
laws and regulations, they may carry on there without impediment
all maritime, industrial, mining and commercial operations on a
footing of absolute equality.
They shall be admitted under the same conditions of equality
to the exercise and practice of all maritime, industrial, mining or
commercial enterprises both on land and in the territorial waters and
no monopoly shall be established on any account or for any enter-
prise whatever.
Notwithstanding any rules relating to coasting trade which may
be in force in Norway, ships of the High Contracting Parties going
to or coming from the territories specified in Article 1 shall have
the right to put into Norwegian ports on their outward or homeward
voyage for the purpose oftaking on board or disembarking passen-
gers or cargo going to or coming from the said territories, or for
any other purpose. As Fleischer points out, the Svalbard has been
presented as a "mini European Community". In the European Com-
munity there is no doubt as to the sovereignty of each State within
its borders, but the member States agreed the right of their nationaIs
to pursue economic activities in the territory of any of the States
of the Community subject to the same rules and conditions as the
nationals of that State (the so-called right of establishment). Like the
right of establishment in the European Community, the rights of the
nationals of contracting States that are recognized in the Treaty of
Spitsbergen ímply no immunity from legislation based on Norwe-
gian territorial sovereignty, though such Iegislation cannot díscrimi-
nate among the nationaIs of the Party States (4). Fleischer states that
the Treaty is based on two fundamental principIes: a) recognition
of the fuIl and absolute sovereignty of Norway; and b) the existence
of certain restrictions relating to the exercise of this) sovereignty,
with a view to providing for the citizens of the other contracting
States a regime of equal access to the exploitation of the natural
resources. In a sense, one might say that the aim was to maintain
the advantages enjoyed under the terra nullius regime by the States
other than Norway, whist at the same time placing the islands under
sovereignty (5). Thus, as Theutenberg points out, "Svalbard ís not
a condominium area with some kind of divided supremacy. The
Treaty does not leave room for any such interpretation. [...] Norway
wields sovereignty, with full and unlimited supremacy, and has the
right to enforce its laws and regulations, provided this is done in
a fair and impartial way, on citizens of the Treaty signatories" (6).
The second paragraph of Art. 5 of the Treaty establishes that
"Conventions shall also be conduded laying down the conditions
under which scientific investigations may be conducted in the said
(4) FLEISCHER: Op. cit.. p.252.
(5) FLEISCHER: "Le régime de exploitation de Spitsberg (Svalbard)", Allllllaire Francaise de Droit
tntemational, XXIV, 1978, pp.276,277.
(6) THEUTENBERG: Op. cit., p.52. There have nevertheless been other opinions on the nature of
the legal regime of the Svalbard. For SOLLIE, the Treaty on Spitsbergen is an aet intermediate between the
placing of a new territory under the sovereignty of a national State and its treatment as a joint interna-
tional arca. or terra communis; Svalbard remains as a kind of lora conl1lrrm;s where all the parties ha ve equal
standing and rights but where their operations and activities must be carried out subject to norrns and
(3) The original signatories also inelude Australia, India, New Zealand and South Afriea. Subse-
quently associated States are Afghanistan, Albania, Germany, Saudi Arabia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria,
Chile, China, Czeehoslovakia the Dominiean Republie, Egypt, Spain, Estonia, Finland, Greece, Hungary,
Monaeo, Poland, Portugal, Switzerland, the U. S. S. R., Venezuela and Yugoslavia. Spain adhered to the
Treaty in November 1925; the date mentioncd in La Gaceta de Madrid of April 13th 1929 is November 2nd,
whilc that mentioned in the Septcmber 10th 1935 issue is November 12th.
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territories". In Art. 8, Norway "undertakes to provide for the ter-
ritories specified in Article 1 mining regulations which [...] exclude
all privileges, monopolies or favours for the benefit of the State or
of the nationals of any one of the High Contracting Parties, including
Norway, [...] Taxes, dues and duties levied shall be devoted exclu-
sively to the said territories and shall not exceed what is required
for the object in view". Moreover (Para. 4), "Three months before
the date fixed for their coming into force, the draft mining regu-
lations shall be communicated by the Norwegian Government to the
other Contracting Powers", and any proposals for their modification
that may be forthcoming from any of the contracting parties during
this three-month period "shall be communicated by the Norwegian
Government to the other Contracting Powers in order that they may
be submitted to examination and the decision of a Commission
composed of one representative of each of the said Powers. This
Commission shall meet at the invitation of the Norwegian Govern-
ment and shall come to a decision within a period of three months
from the date of its first meeting. Its decisions shall be taken by
a majority". Mining regulations in consonance with Art. 8 of the
Treaty were provided by a Royal Resolution of August 7th 1925;
prior to their establishment, conversations took place between Norway
and the other nations whose interests they would affect, and since
there was no dissent from the Norwegian proposal the previsions
of Art. 8 concerning the working mechanism of an arbitrating Corn-
mission were never put into effect (7). By Art. 8 Para. 3 of the Treaty,
"the Norwegian Government shall have the right to levy an export
duty which shall not exceed 1% of the maximum value of the
minerals exported up to 100,000 tons, and beyond that quantity the
duty will be proportionately diminished. The value shall be fixed
at the end of the navigation season by calculating the average free
on board price obtained". In Art. 9, Norway "undertakes not to
create nor to allow the establishment oí any naval base in the
territories specified in Article 1 and not to construct any fortification
in the said territories, which may never be used for warlike pur-
poses". This Article was not respected during World War II by the
belligerents: after occupying Norway, the German forces disem-
barked in Spitsbergen in 1941, they were expelled by the Allied
forces at the endof the same year, and counterattacked in 1942,when
they seriously damaged the mining machinery. Theutenberg remarks
that the Svalbard is "placed under a certain form of demilitarized
regíme", but that there is "room for various interpretations" of the
wording in this respecto Though the Treaty refers to "warlike pur-
poses", it .seems pertinent to wonder whether its text is compatible
with the establishment oí naval bases and the construction of Ior-
tifications for military purposes; while it would appear to be difficult
to achieve undivided opinion on exactly the point at which "military
purposes" become "warlike purposes", it is nonetheless true that it
is "the exclusive responsibility of the holder of sovereignty to guarantee
the security of the area and to defend it in the event of a military
attack" (8).
At the time at which the Treaty of Spitsbergen was concluded,
a number of circumstances that have since arisen - among them
issues deriving from the new Law of the Sea, such as those con-
cerning the continental shelf and the Exclusive Economic Zone -
were not foreseeable, and the Treaty accordingly fails to face squarely
up to them. In particular, in relation to the limitations placed upon
the exercise of Norwegian sovereignty, in 1920 the Law of the Sea
recognized no jurisdiction other than what might be exercised over
territorial waters, which in the Scandinavian nations were tradition-
ally defined by a four-mile limit (a limit that in 1951 was formally
accepted by the United Kingdom before the International Court of
[ustice in the Anglo-Norwegian fisheries case ). The Norwegian Act
on Svalbard dated July 17th 1925, which in Section 1 states that
Svalbard forms part of the Kingdom of Norway, nevertheless estab-
lishes in Section II that Norwegian legislation does not automaticalIy
apply there (Norwegian civil law, penal law and legislation on the
administration of justice are to apply save provision to the contrary,
but other legislation is to be applied only if such application is
explicitly provided for). Asin-Cabrera has emphasized that "the content
of this provision had as a result the nonapplication of Norwegian
economic and administrative law in the Archipelago, especiaIly
(8) Cfr. THEUTENBERG: Op. cit., p.52. Save for the period 01 World War 11,Art. 9 has undoubtedly
contributed to the low level 01 tension in the area (SOLLlE: "Norway's Continental Shelf and the Boundary
Question on the Seabed", Tire Challenge ... , cit., pp.111, 112). As one of the most important principIes 01 the
Treaty, SKAGESTAD and TRAAVIK mention the complete demilitarization and neutraJization of the
region (SKAGESTAD, G. and TRAAVIK, K.: "New Problems Old Solutions", Tire C/lal/ellge ... , p.44). On the
history 01 the interpretation 01 Art.9, see BRETION, Ph.: "L'Union Sovietique et la cause de non-militarisation
du Spitzberg", A.F.D./., XI, 1965, pp.I22-144.
regulations established by a Sta te whose sovereignty has been recognized (SOLLlE, F.: "The New Devel-
opment in the Polar Regions", Tlle Challenge 01 New Terruories, Oslo, 1974, p.29).
(7) For the mining regulations, see FLEISCHER: "Le régime ...", cit., pp.285-295.
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regulations on the import and export of goods, the exclusion. of
Spitsbergen from the domain of Norwegian customs thereby bemg
recognized" (9). Norway nevertheless maintains that its sovereignty
cannot be questioned on the basis of extensive interpretations of
Arts. 2, 3 and 8 of the Treaty, which apply to the islands and their
four-mile territorial sea; and consequently that the continental shelf
on which the islands are located is subject to ordinary Norwegian
law as established in the Royal Resolutíon of December 8th 1972 on
the continental shelf, and not to the specific regime for Spitsbergen.
In maintaining this, it is asserted that the Archipelago has no continental
shelf of its own, but lies on the continental shelf of Norway. Fleischer
and Van der Essen note that Norway likewise claims that the exclusive
economic zone of Spitsbergen is not affected by the Treaty of 1920(0).
For Van der Essen, however, the Norwegian argument is not con-
vincing: "[Norwayl ignores the important fact that the Treaty of 1920
does not apply solely to emergent lands and their territorial seas,
but to an entire zone comprised between the 74th and 81st parallels
North and the 10th and 35thmeridians of longitude East, comprising
large parts of what in 1920was high sea. More than 600 km of high
sea separate the southern típ of the largest island from the south-
eastern comer of the area. Any extension of the coastal State's
jurisdiction within this area must necessarily be subject to applica-
tion of the provisions of the Treaty; it would hardly be reasonable
to suppose that the contractíng parties enjoy equal treatment as
regards the exploitation of minerals, hunting and fishing on the land
and in the territorial sea (the Treaty says 'territorial waters', without
establishing their limits), which are under the 'full and absolute'
sovereignty of Norway, but are not to obtain benefit in the areas
where Norway only exercises sovereign rights to certain ends" (11).
Though the final consideration here seem tenable, the matter nev-
ertheless appears to require further consideration. To begin with,
Art. 1 of the Treaty on Spitsbergen does not seem to imply any
reference at a11to the high sea adjacent to the territorial seas of the
islands. This conclusion follows both from the text itself, and from
the elementary consideration that it would have made no sense for
Art. 2 to recognize equal rights of fishing in "territorial waters" that
were to be understood as including both the waters within the 4-
mile limit and areas of "what in 1920 was high sea", since such an
"understanding" would not have been compatible with the legal
character of the high sea. Moreover, Van der Essen's reading of Art.
1 does not seem acceptable in the absence of any kind of explicit
reference in this Article to the waters of the Archipelago as such.
It is extremely difficult to see how one might reconcile an extensive
interpretation of "territorial waters" with the wording of Art. 2 in
terms of "the rights of fishing and hunting in the territories specified
in Article 1 and in their territorial waters", waters that must certainly
have been understood as the territorial sea at a time, 1920, in which
the law of the sea obeyed a "regime based fundamentally on zones
of territorial seas and high seas configured in such wise that the
extent of the territorial seas fell in with the maritime interests of
the major powers" (2). There would appear to be no doubt about
it: "The Treaty is applicable to the islands within the area defined
in article 1, the so-called Svalbard net, as well as to the territorial
sea of the islands, which is 4 nautical miles" (3).
Notwithstanding the above considerations, the problem should,
1 feel, be studied in more detail before final conclusions are reached.
It is relevant to recall the position regarding Spitsbergen, its con-
tinental shelf and its exclusive economic zone that was maintained
by Fleischer, according to whom it is necessary to take into account
both the specific legal regime established for the Archipelago in the
Treaty of 1920 and also the Law of the Sea in general as it may
apply to theparticular situation of Spitsbergen (4). Like Fleischer,
1 feel that the text of the Convention on the Law of the Sea contains
no impediment to the establishment of an exclusive economic zone
(9) ASIN·CABRERA, Ma.A.: Islas y archipieíagoe en las Comllnidades Europeas, Madrid, 1988, p.153;
our translation. See aIso OPSHAL, T.: "Norwegian Dependencies, particularly Spitzbergen and the Euro-
pean Communities", Legal Problems of an Enlarged European Communítu, British Institute Studies in Inter-
nationaI and Comparative Law, No. 6, London, 1972.
(ID) FLEISCHER: "Le regime ...", cit., pp. 295, 296. Fleischer asserts that even if Spitsbergen had a
continental shelí, it would fall within the scope of Art.1 of the Treaty, which would leave the Norwegian
legislator entirely free. For Van der Essen's view, see VAN DER ESSEN: ."Les regions arctiqu,:s. et
antarctíques". Traité du Nouveau Droit de la Mer, París, 1985, p.475. Concermng the process ofre~lSlon
of the Law of the Sea, the following may be consulted (among others), POCH et al.: La actual revisron del
Derecho del mar. Una perspectiva española. 4 vols., Madrid, 1974. PÉREZ·GONZALEZ, M: "La ordenación
jurídica del mar: factores en presencia", Temas Maritimos, Santiago de Cornpostela, 1981. DUPUY, RJ and
VIGNES, D. (Dírs.): Traité du Nouveau Droit de la Mer, Paris, 1 985 ..O'CONNELL, D. 1'.:The Internahonal
Law of the Sea, 2 vols.. Oxford, 1982 (vol. 1) and 1984 (vol. ll), .
(11) VAN DER ESSEN: "Les regions ...", cit., p.475; our translatlon.
(12) MARTINEZ-PUÑAL: Los derechos de los Estados sin litoral v el. sitllacion geográfica desventajosa
en la Zonn Econolllica Exclusiva· Participación en la explotación de los recursos vivos, Santiago de Gompostela,
1988, p.19. See also PASTOR·RlDRUEJO, J. A.: Curso de Derecho Internacional Público y Organizaciones
Internacionales, 3rd ed., Madrid, 1981, p.461; and Id.: "Consideraciones sobre la III Conferencia de las
Naciones Unidas sobre el Derecho del Mar", Anuario de Derecho Internacional, vol. III, 1976, pp. 281, 282.
(13) THEUTENBERG: Op. cit., p.52.
(14) FLEISCHER: "The question .... ", cit., p.254.
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for Spitsbergen, and that there is likewise no provision in the Treaty
of Spitsbergen that denies Norway the extension of its maritime
jurisdiction in accordance with general international law. It was on
similar grounds that, in the Act of December 17th 1976, Norway
established an exclusive economic zone of 200 miles off both con-
tinental Norway and Spitsbergen, though the Royal Decree of the
same date that put the Act into force restricted the exclusive eco-
noniic zone to the mainland; later (on June 3rd 1977, with effect from
June 15th of that year), another Decree was promulgated that applied
the Act of 1976 to Spitsbergen, though rather than an exclusive
economic zone it established only a fisheries conservation zone with
no discrimination and in which the regulations were to be applied
to all parties on an equal footing (15). Thus the Norwegian govern-
ment judges it to be lawful to crea te an economic zone around
Spitsbergen, and though it has not in fact done so it is pertinent
to investigate whether, should it do so, it would be possible for the
contracting Parties of the Treaty on Spitsbergen to invoke their
rights, as agreed in the Treaty, to carry on certain activities upon
an equal footing. To this end it is illuminating to. discuss separately
the legality of similar claims with respect to, o.n the one hand, the
continental shelf and, on the other, the exclusive economic zone.
Fleischer first approached the question of whether the rights
afforded to other States under the Treaty on Spitsbergen are appli-
cable to the continental shelf. He points out that general law on the
continental shelf or exclusive economic zone contains no. specific
provision concerning obligations contracted prior to the emergence
of such law. He therefore turns to the Treaty on Spitsbergen, maintaining
that its chief provisión is Art. 1, which recognizes the sovereignty
of Norway, whereas Arts. 2, 3 and 8 must be considered as specific
exceptions that cannot be given an extensive interpretation. These
limitations of sovereignty should thus be understood in a restrictive
sense: any issue not covered by any specific article on the rights
of foreign nationals is subject to Art. 1, which recognizes the sov-
ereignty of Norway, without any specific limitation.
Applying the above reasoning to the question of the continental
shelf, Fleischer concludes that the rights agreed in the Treaty on
Spitsbergen are applicable to territorial seas extending for four miles
from straight baselines, and that the continental shelf is subject, as
was mentioned above, to the ordinary legislation on the continental
shelf(in particular the Resolution of December 8th 1972) and not
to a specific regime for Spitsbergen involving the provision of rights
fo.r.the other Par~ies to t~e Treaty. He argues that the Treaty on
SpItsb~rgen contams nothm? that place s any obligation upon Nor-
~~y .wlth respect to the contmental shelf, and supports the view that
it IS incorrect to speak of a "Spitsbergen shelf"; the continental shelf
of th~ islands being a prolongation of continental Norway, "their"
shelf IS part of the contine~tal shelf of Norway, and is hence subject
to the gen~ra!,rules for contmental shelves (16). This reasoning accepts
tha~ there l~ one homogeneous shelf, extending from the Norwegian
mamland nght up to the Arctic deep sea north of Svalbard over
which regíon Norway would have [...] exclusive rights to control
all forms of activity", though l' exceptíons have to be made for the
shelf lying within the Svalbard Islands' territorial seas, to which area
theSpitzbergen Treaty is applicable" (17).
Analogous problerns arise concerning the establishment around
Svalbard of zones such as the exclusive economic zone. With regard
to the ex~lusive. economic zone, Fleischer applies reasoning similar
to that wielded m the case of the continental shelf, stressing the fact
that the exclusive economic zone is a new concept in international
law, one that is distinct from that of the territorial sea, and that there
are no grounds upon which the Treaty's specific restrictions to
Norw~gia~ so.vereig~ty over the territorial seas may be given an
e~tenslve .II~terpretahon that allows their application to sovereign
nghts denvmg from recent developments in the handling of mari-
(15) In spite 01 which. the Soviet Union has argued that this zone contravenes the Treaty 01 1920
(FLEISCHER: "The Northern Waters and the New Maritime Zones", Gcrmall Ycarbook ol/o,'cma'iollall.JIw,
vol. 22, 1979, p.1I0) ..
(16) FLEISCHER: "The question ...", cit., pp. 255-259. Fleischer expounds similar argumenls in
I~lernallo~al Ú1w and Its Appliealioll ;11 Ihe Arelic, Conference Hosted by Ihe Norwegian Petroleum Associa-
tíon, 1980. p. 9 01 the texl sent me by the author; and in "The New Regime of Maritime Fisheries", R. des
e, t. 209, 1988, 11, pp. 216-220.
(17) Cfr. THEUTENBERG: op. cit., p.52. Norway's rights are defended by SOLLlE: "New Terrilories
~nd New Problems m Norwegian Foreign Security Policy", The Chal/elige ... , cit., pp.107-109. Some comment
IS necessary regardi~g the idea that the continental shelf 01 the islands is a prolongation 01 mainland
Nor~vay. Wlthout wishíng to deny this fact, I suggest Ihat it should be viewed in a broader context: "The
continental shelf .around Ihe Sv~lbard archipelago is very extensive; indeed, most of it may be considercd
as a mere extension of Norway s mainland shelf. On the west side, the Svalbard shelf stretches as far as
the Lena :rough. which se~arates it from Greenland and, on the east síde, it extends lo form part of the
same contínental shelf which surrounds Franz-josef Land, an archipelago belonging to Ihe U.s.s.R. The
conh~ental slope and nse are also extensivo, partieulariy to where they reaeh into the Barents Abyssal
Plam (PHARAND, D.: TI" Law of Ihe.Sea of the Arelie, wilh Speeial Reierence lo Callada, Ottawa, 1973, pp.
259,260; the italics are mine), Concermng the Russian position on the continental shelf 01 Spitsbergen see
O:>TRENG, W.: "The Continental Shelf - Issues in the 'Eastern' Arctic Ocean. Implieations of UNCLOS 111.
with special reference lo the Informal Composite Negoliations Text (ICNT)", in Law of ti re Sea: Neglcctcd
lssues, Proceedmgs of the Law of the Sea Institute Twelfth Annual Conference at The Hague October 23-
261978, Hawaii, 1979, pp.172·181.
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time matters by general internationallaw (18). Accordingly, Fleischer
maintains that the establishment of a non-discriminatory fisheries
protection zone by Norway must be looked upon as a self-imposed
limitation motivated by practical rather than legal considerations (19).
Against Fleischer's arguments, it must be said that - as Van
der Essen pointed out - it is hard to accept that the contracting
Parties should enjoy equal rights of hunting and fishing on land and
in the territorial sea, but not on the continental shelf and in the
excIusive economic zone. The Treaty on Spitsbergen arose from the
contracting Parties' willingness to establish an equitable regime in the
regíon; Fleischer's theses lead towards tensions that would make suit
of the achievement of the useful effect of the Treaty of 1920. If the
teleological intent of the Treaty on Spitsbergen is dismissed, leaving
room only for the most rigid of interpretations, the historical reasons
for the Treaty are implicitly questioned (20). Analysis in this direc-
tion might well bring up points that would enrich debate on the
desirability of modifying the Treaty on Spitsbergen, and if so in what
terms.
In the light of the foregoing, I would wholeheartedly endorse
Theutenberg's concIusion that it is difficuIt to interpret old treaties
such as the Treaty on Spitsbergen in terms of new circumstances
such as legal recognition of the continental shelf or the excIusive
economic zone, for the opinion of the signatories is relevant for
interpretation when a new "structure" must be considered for the
region in question. In particular, 1 ha ve already mentioned the Soviet
stance against the fishing zone around Svalbard (see footnote 15);
Sweden, on the other hand, considered the continental shelf of the
archipelago as under Norwegian sovereignty on the occasion of the
scientific expedition to the Svalbard by the Swedish state icebreaker
Ymer in 1980 (the Ymer-80 expedition), Theutenberg reflects that
Those who had previously experienced the liberty and accessi-
bility of the Arctic, in the legal sense, found it hard to understand
how new legal rules could have transformed the conditions of access
and research to such a great extent. Here again an example of the
revolution in the law of the sea was shown. The scientific activities
of the Ymer expedition had to be discussed in advance with states
in whose areas and on whose continental shelf the scientific activities
were to take place. For example, current international law made it
necessary to obtain permission to extract samples from the continental
shelf of a foreign sta te. [....] The necessary permission was obtained
without difficulty from Norway and Denmark The project was a joint
Swedish-Norwégian-Danish scientific project which also included
participants from other countries. (21)
It must be emphasized that Norway's stance has not gone
uncontested. According to Theutenberg:
The Soviet Union claims that the Svalbard Treaty should also be
valid for the Svalbard shelf, Le. a border line should be drawn between
Svalbard's "legal shelf" and the Norwegian mainland shelf. The sig-
natory powers, backed by the definition of the Treaty, should be
allowed to exercise activities like oil prospecting and drilling on the
Svalbard shelf, The United States and Great Britain also have reser-
vations against the Norwegian interpretation and seem to advocate
some kind of "international line" on the basis of the provisions of the
Treaty. [...] one can perhaps divine the wish behind the Soviet stand
to preserve a vital area under an international, treaty-bound regime,
and thereby prevent the area from entirely falling under one single
holder of sovereignty. (22)
The lack of concord on the current legal status of the Spitsbergen
region naturally reflects not only interest in the mode of application
of the new Law of the Sea, but also the present and future value
of the territories in dispute. Once more, we see that it is not easy
for the parties involved to overlook the strategic value of Spitsbergen,
(18) FLElSCHER: "The question ...", cit., pp.259,260; "Internatíonal.;", cit., pp.9,1O and 14; Id. "The
New ..." cit., pp. 216·220.
(19) Ibid.: pp. 260, 261.
(20) lt is perhaps pertinent to point out, as Skagestad and Traavik ha ve done, that the Treaty on
Spitsbergen is an example of the regulation of a region's status, as regards sovereignty and jurisdietion,
by a proeess of intemational negotiation, and should be looked on as a form of international eooperation.
lf this solution was seen as natural, it was beeause of the historieal situation· and the prevailing political
premises. In particular, a) economie aetivity in the Svalbard had increased before the question of sover-
eignty was clarified; b) no nation had uneontestable grounds for unilateral oecupation of the archipelago;
e) there were politkal and seeurity reasons against a unilateral solution, sinee the arehipelago was
regarded as having strategic importance by several powers, none of which by itself exercised sufficient
predominance in the region as to impose such a solution (SKAGESTAD, K. and TRAAVIK-, K.: "New
Problems - Old Solutions". The Challenge ... , cit., pA5).
(21) THEUTENBERG: op. cit., pp.54,56. Unlike Norway and Denmark, the U.S.S.R. did not grant
permission for the extraction of samples from its continental shelf. With regard to the prillciple of cOlIsmt
by the coastal State in questions of scientific marine research, see PÉREZ-GONZALEZ: "La investigacion
científica marina y el nuevo Derecho del Mar", Anuario de Derecho Marítimo, vol.V, pp.62·70 and pp.45-
96 passim.
(22) Ibid.: pp. 53, 54. The Soviet Union has also shown a wish to extend the territorial seas of the
islands of the arehipelago out to 12 miles so as to enlarge the area open to possible exploitation of
resources (YOUNG, O.R. and·OSHERENKO, c.: "Arctic Resources Conflict: Sources and Conflict", Uniied
Slates Arc!ic lnteresís - TI,e 1980s a"d /9905, New York, 1984, p.261).
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1.2. THE BARENTS SEA
matter (26). Both Norway and the Soviet Un ion are parties to the
Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf, Art. 6 of which es-
tablishes that, in the absence oí special circumstances or other solutions
arrived at by the interested parties, the median line príncíple should
be adhered to. The median line principle, or principle of equidistance,
is current in Norwegian law by virtue of an Act of [une 21st 1963
and a Royal Resolution of May 31st 1963. Soviet law too has in-
corporated this princíple, in Section 2 a Decree of February 6th 1968
that el osely follows the wording of the Geneva text, ineluding the
reference to "special circumstances". I~ the present dispute, the
interested parties do not agree on the way in which the rule con-
cerningthe median line and specíal circumstances should be applied.
Norway's position is that equidistance is the appropriate criterion,
whereas the Soviet Union invokes special circumstances in favour
of division along the sector line (fundamentally, the meridian run-
ning from the former western frontier of the Soviet Union up to the
North Pole), the zone to the east of which was claimed in a Decree
of 1926(27). In detail, the sector line starts at the Soviet border as
it was before the annexation of Petsamo, heads due north along
longitud e 32° 04' 35" East as far as the 74th parallel (the southern
boundary established in Art. 1 of the Treaty on Spitsbergen), turns
due east along the parallel as far as longitude 35° East, turns north
again along the eastern boundary established in the Treaty until
reachíng the northern boundary, parallel 81° North, turns west along
this parallel, and upon reaching longitude 32° 04' 35" East again
continues along the meridian to the Poleo There thus exists a dis-
puted area claimed by both Norway and the U.S.S.R.
The "special circumstances" invoked by the Soviet Union as
grounds for partition along the sector line are of an extremely broad
nature. As Shusterich has stressed, they appear to be related less
to the more usual argument otan "un usual coastal configuration"
than to the special strategic needs of the State and the large con-
centrations of population in the regíon adjacent to the Barents Sea (28).
The latter consideration is one of the "special circumstances" that
Theutenberg labelled "general considerations" in the sense that "they
which was convincingly proven during World War II, when the
passage of convoys through the sea roads to Murmansk made a vital
contribution to the Soviet response to German aggression. Today,
the sea route from the naval base of the Kola peninsula out to the
high seas is seen as of similar importance. These considerations make
the regio n around Spitsbergen increasingly critical in a context in
which the balance of power is closely related to the possession of
submarines carrying nuclear weapons (23). It is also true that since
1934 the Soviet Union has become increasingly engaged in economic
activity in the area, notably coal mining ; of the 3, 300 or so residents
of the Spitsbergen islands, onIy some 1, 200 are Norwegian and
almost twice that number - 2,100 - are Russians (24). The significant
legal, strategic and economic interests of the Soviet Union 'in the
Svalbard lead it from time to time to propose new arrangements
aimed at the creation of some kind of condominium with Norway (25),
a proposaI 1 find no grounds for.
(26) THEUTENBERG: op. cit., p. 50.
(27) VAN DER ESSEN: "Les regions ....", cit.. p.476. FLEISCHER: "International...", cit., p. 11.
(28) SHUSTERICH, K.M.: "lnternational Jurisdiclional lssues in the Arctic Ocean", Uniled Suues
Arelic interesis - Tire 19805 and 19905, New York, 1984, pp. 259, 260. This article has also been published
in OD.I.L., vol.14, Nc.3, 1984, pp. 235-272.
To some extent related to the Spitsbergen issue is the problem
of dividing the Barents Sea between Norway and Russia. The Barents
Sea líes of the coasts of northern mainland Norway, western Spitsbergen
and northern European Russia. The question of the partition of the
continental shelf and the delimitation of exclusive economic zones
in this area has not been settled in spite of the negotiations that
have taken place for this purpose, and Arts. 74 and 83 of the
Convention on the Law of the Sea are of no specific help in this
(23) FLEISCHER: "Le régime ...", cit., pp.275,276. lbid.: "The Northern ... ", cit., p. 102.
(24) Spitzbergen (Svalbardi: General tniormation, 2nd Conference of European Island Regions, Ponta
Delgada, Sáo Miguel, Acores, 27-29 March 1984, Doc.CPL/am/I1es/lnf.(84)7.
(25) THEUTENBERG: op. cit., p.54. Though alI the signatory States have the right to maintain
permanent establishments on the islands, only Norway and the Soviet Union ha ve made use of this right.
In 1944, the sovereignty 01 Norway was unsuccesslulIy chalIenged by the U. S. S. R., which desired joint
administralion by Norway and itself and the cession 01 Bear Island to the U. S. S. R. Possession of this
island would give the Soviet Unión better control over possible access by N .A.T.O. forces to the important
Soviet base at Kola. The U. S. S. R. has long sought to increase its land rights over the islands, demanding
to take part in certain activities and maintaining at its coal mines a population larger than the resident
Norwegian community (YOUNG and OSHERENI<O: op. cit., p.261). Concerning the Russian position on
Spitsbergen, see WESTERMEYER, W.E.: The Poluics of Mineral Resource Development in Antarctica
Alternative Regimes far the Future, Boulder Co., 1984, pp. 69-71.
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are not specifically characteristic of the Arctic, but may be applied
to any region whatsoever". He also drew attention to another cat-
egory of "specíal circumstances", those constituting "what could be
termed as Arctic legal arguments [... ] based on .the physical and
climatic peculiarities of the region. " It has been argued that the
existence of the sector principle is itself such a drcumstance, since
because of the polar nature of the region it arose naturally in early
territorial claims on the Arctic (29).
The question of the partition of the continental shelf in the
Barents Sea between Norway and the Soviet Union was first brought
up by the Norwegian government in 1967. Negotiations have con-
tinued intermittently since 1974, but an immediate solution does not
seem imminent. The Soviet Union's position reflects crucial interests:
acceptance of division along the sector line would give the U.S.S.R.
jurisdiction over many thousands of square kilometres of a sea that
has rich fishing banks (30), a bed that is potentially rich in energy
resources, and - perhaps of greatest importance -a strategically vital
location (31).
It should be pointed out that the Soviet Union has never maintained
that the sector principle is applicable to the Arctic deep water basin,
which it has in many respects treated pragmatically as open sea from
the legal point óf view (32).
The terms in which the Barents Sea case has been conducted
can be seen as a sign of the presence of the new Law of the Sea
on the delimitation of exclusive economic zones and the partition
of the continental shelf between States situated opposite or adjacent
. to each other; for although the median line principle is well estab-
lished in International Law, the Convention on the Law of the Sea
does not mention this principle explicitly in dealing with the de-
limitation of the exclusive economic zone (Art, 74 ) and the con-
(29) THEUTENBERG : op. cit., p. 51.
(30) In [une 1983, on the occasion of Soviet test drilling, the rich living resources of these waters
led the Norwegian press to call for environmental protection measures in the area (THEUTENBERG: op.
cii., p. 57).
(31) TRAAVIK, K. and OSTRENG, W.: "The Arctic Ocean and the Law of the Sea", The CIlallenge ... ,
cü., p. 59. Shusterich reckons that the disputed area covers 132, 000 km' oi continental shelí, whose fishing
and possible deposits oi hydrocarbons and other minerals are the bone oi contention (SHUsTERICH:" op.
cil., p. 258). Theutenberg writes of "about 155,000 km2 Le. anarea larger than the Norwegian North Sea
continental shelf (approx, 144, 000 km2) and somewhat less than one-half of Norway's land area"
(THEUTENBERG: op. cil., p. 50). Concerning the dispute in general, see OSTRENG, op. cit., pp. 166-172 ;
and PHARAND, "The Legal regime of the Arctic: some outstanding issues", IlIle",aliollal [curnal, XXXIX,
1984, pp. 749-752.
(32) THEUTENBERG: op. cit., p. 40.
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tinental shelf (Art, 83).At most, an implicit reference may be perceived
in the wording of the first paragraphs of these two Articles: "The
delimitation of the [exclusive economic zone (Art. 74) or continental
shelf (Art. 83)] between States with opposite or adjacent coasts shall
be effected by agreement on the basis of international law, as re-
ferred to in Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of
Justice, in. order to achieve an equitable solution". The key notion
in the new law of the sea appears to be that of equity. Further in
the spirit of the Convention on the Law of the Sea ( specifically,
Art. 74 Para. 3), joint fisheries jurisdiction by Norway and the
U.S.S.R. has been established, as a provisional practical measure
pending resolution of the demarcation dispute and without prejudice
to its final solution (33), over a large región ( the so-called Grey
Zone) comprising areas to the west of the sector line, to the east
of the median line and between the two (34); this agreement and
an annexed protocol was arrived at in an exchange of letters con-
cluding on January 11th 1978, and is subject to annual renewal (35).
It establishes a quota for third party States, who carry out fishing
activities under joint Soviet Norwegian licence. As a closing remark
it may be mentioned that although the United States has adopted
no official stance regarding this jurisdictional dispute, it seems clear
that for military or even economic reasons it is likely to view the
Norwegian position more favourably than the Soviet arguments (36).
1.3. GREENLAND.
Except for Australia, Greenland is the largest island in the
world. Located between latitudes 50° 46' and 83° 39' North and
longitudes 10° 33" and 73° West, it has an area of 2,175,000 km2,
five sixths of which is covered by the immense Islandis glacier. Its
population of some 60,000 inhabitants is concentrated in the narrow
coastal strip of variable breadth that remains ice-free.
(33) VAN DER ESSEN: "Les regions ...", cit., pA77. LAURSEN, F.: "Security Aspects of Danish and
Norwegian Law of the Sea", Ocean Oevelopmellt alld IlIternatiollal Lnw, vol.18, No.2, 1987, pp.218-220. HEY.
E.: The Regime for the Exploitatioll ofTransbol/lldary Marille Fisheries Resources. Dordrecht, 1989, pp. 169-171.
(34) FLEIsCHER: "The Northern ... ", cit., p.1I3.
(35) Its text may be consulted in Ouerenskomsier ... , 1978, p. 436.
(36) sHUsTERICH: "International...", ci/., p.258.
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Under Scandinavian occupation since the 10th century, since the
18th century southwest Greenland has been occupied by Denmark,
the first administrative regulations dating from 1781. Between 1916
and 1920 Denmark persuaded the major powers to recognize its
sovereignty over the whole island (37). In 1922, however; Norway
established a station in the "forgotten" northeast of the island, and
in a Royal Decree of Iuly 10th 1931 proclaimed Norwegian occu-
pation of and sovereignty over eastern Greenland. Two days later
(July 12th 1931), the Danish government filed a plea requesting the
Permanent International Court of Justice to declare Norway's action
to be illegitimate, invalid and a violation of the existing legal situ-
ation. Denmark claimed that, under Art. 4 of the Kiel Peace Treaty
of January 14th 1814, its rights extended to the whole of Greenland
and that its authority had in effect been maintained there. Norway
replied that Denmark exercised no effective control over eastern
Greenland, which had thereby become terra nullius susceptible of
occupation. In its 12-to-2 majority verdict of April5th 1933, the Court
decided in favour oí Denmark. The sentence deemed that animus
possessionis and corpus possessionis in the chief place s of the territory
constituted valid claim to title over a territory if the natural con-
ditions of such terrítory made it impossible to exercise effective
control at each point within it; it also remarked that "Before pro-
ceeding to consider in detail the evidence submitted to the Court,
it may be well to sta te that a claim to sovereignty based not upon
some particular act or title such as a treaty of cession but merely
upon continued display of authority, involves two elements each of
which must be shown to exist: the intention and will to act as
sovereign, and some actual exercise or display of such authority [...]
It is impossible to read the records of the decisions in the cases as
to territorial sovereignty without observing that in many cases the
tribunal has been satisfied with very little in the way of the actual
exercise oí sovereign rights, provided that the other State could not
make out a superior claim. This is particularly true in the case oí
(37) For example, the rights 01 Denmark were recognized by the United States, in a treaty dated
August 4th 1916, in return lor the cession 01 the Danish Antilles. France, Italy and [apan agreed without
reserve, while the United Kingdom, desirous 01 saleguarding the rights 01 Cariada, agreed with the
condition that it should be consulted by Denmark prior to any alíenalion 01 the territories in question.
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claims to sovereignty over areas in thinly populated or unsettled
countries" (38).
Kish has suggested that the Court's willingness to accept a
slight degree of effective control as a valid basis for claim to sov-
ereignty over a territory with difficult natural conditions must have
been influenced by the consideration that a11other Arctic land territories
were in any case subject to territorial sovereignty; and that this
consideration would not be applicable to the non-terrestrial Arctic
or the Antarctic, for which the scant possibility of effective control
would imply a correspondingly small possibility of valid claim to
sovereignty (39).
The sentence issued by the International Court of Justice on
April 5th 1933 recognized the exclusive rights of Denmark over the
whole of Greenland, it being held that since the geographical nature
of the northern lands did not allow satisfaction of the normal criteria
.of effective occupation, simple control in the form of the effective
authority exercised in the southwest should be considered sufficient
grounds for sovereignty over the whole island (40). This sentence
settled the last challenge to national sovereignty over an Arctic
territory ~though as we have seen, there rema in certain outstanding
border disputes, especially in relation to the new law of the sea).
However, despite unanimous recognitionof Danish sovereignty, the
status of Greenland was complicated by the German invasion of
Denmark during World War 11(on April 9th 1940). In view of this
invasión, which threatened Greenland and Iceland (lceland was a
Danish colony until 1918 - with a certain degree of autonomy since
1874 - and continued under the Danish Crown, albeit as a sovereign
State, until [une 7th 1944),the United States could not remain indifferent,
(38) Legal Statlls af Easte", Greenlalld ¡lIdgemellt, 5 April 1933 (PCIJ Series AB/43, p.22). Pastor.
~idruejo points out that "W~ are really laced with a case 01 extreme modulation of effectivily by relativity
In the exercise ?,I State functions. To this must be added the recognition, or at least, the absence of protest
01 third parties (PASTO·RIDRUEJO: Curso ... , cit., p. 461; our translalion) .
. (39) KISH,].: The LAw of Internationat Spaces, Leiden, 1973, pp. 74, 75. Concerning the acquisition of
sovereignty In the Arctic, see CAFLlSCH, L.: "Le regime juridique de l'Arctique", Les régions polaires et./ew
che.rcheurs suisses, 1988, p.52.
(40) In 1953, Greenland was lormally brought under Danish law. On January 17th 1978, the
populatIon of the island approved by relerendum the coming into lorce 01 a Stalute of Autonomy on May
1st of that year. On February 23rd 1982, after another referendum, Greenland withdre.w from the European
Com.m~nity, into which it had been brought by the entry of Denmark on January 1st 1973. A Treaty
rnodifying the Constitutlve Treaties 01 the European Communities with regard lo Crcenland was signed
In Brussels on March 13lh 1984 and carne into force on January ls11985. See ASINCABRERA: "Groenlandia:
el resultado de un referéndum", Reuistn de lnstiíucíones Europeas, vol.9, N." 3, SeptcmbciDcccmbcr 1982,
pp. 843-845; and Isla~.... , cu., pp. 216-232.
52 SCIENTIA IVRIDICA
THE LEGAL REGIME OF THE ARCTIC 53
for !celand and Greenland played, in the west, the same strategic
role as 5pitsbergen in the east. Negotiations between the U. S. 5tate
Department and the representative of Denmark in Washington led
to an exchange of notes (April 7-9th 1941) in which the United States,
while recognizing Danish sovereignty over Greenland, pointed out
that it was impossible for Denmark to exercise such sovereignty over
its territory; with references to the Monroe Doctrine and the acts
of La Habana (July 30th 1940), in which the defence of regions of
the Western Hemisphere belonging to European powers was antici-
pated in the interests of U. S. security, a number of measures were
agreed that amounted to the organization of a defensive system
(airforce bases, meteorological stations, port installations, etc.). These
measures were incorporated in the Agreement of April 9th 1944 that
originated the U.5. presence in Greenland (41).
Though there remain outstanding issues in the Greenland area
with regard to the law of the sea, they do not seem to be critical
at this time. In 1973, almost uneventful agreement was reached by
Canada and Denmark, roughly on the basis of the median line
príncíple, on the partition of the continental shelf between Greenland
and Canada. Perhaps the chief feature of this agreement for this
discussion is the treatment of Hans Island, an uninhabited island
less than a mile long lying exactly astride the median line between
Greenland and Ellesmere Island in the Nares Strait (latitude 80° 49'
N). This small area has be en left blank in the list of geographical
coordinates contained in the Agreement; the agreed frontier halts
at the southern Hans Island low water mark and resumes at the
northern low water mark (42). To the east of Greenland, the bound-
ary between the continental shelves of Greenland and the Svalbard
can probably be considered as defined naturally by the Nansen
Fracture Zone, with the Yermark shelf constituting the limit of the
Svalbard shelf jurisdiction (43). Denmark established an exclusive
economic zone for Greenland on [une 1st 1980 (a relatively late date;
most Arctic States proclaimed their zones in 1977). Fishing limits
between Greenland and !celand have been fixed on the basis of the
median line prínciple (44).
1.4. ELLESMERE ISLAND.
In 1920 the Canadian government urged the Danish government
to limit hunting by Greenland Eskimoes on Ellesmere Island (196,236
km2). Denmark replied that it shared the opinion of the Danish
explorer Rasmussen that the island was an unoccupied territory. The
United Kingdom presented a note to Denmark in Canada's name,
and Denmark made no more of the matter, probably because the
United Kingdorn's recognition of Danish sovereignty over Greenland
persuaded the Danish government to abandon claims to Ellesmere (45).
In the Danish-Canadian agreement on the partition of the
continental shelf between Ellesmere Island and Greenland, the partition
line begins at 82° 13' North 60° West, and continues in accordance
with the median line principIe, except where the special confígu-
ration of the coastline or the presence or sizeof certain islands have
made it appropriate to deviate from the median line. It is to be
expected that Denmark and Canada will adopt a similar approach
to the partition of the rest of the shelf in the Lincoln Sea. It is possible
that the partition in this area has been postponed simply pending
further information on the geology of the Lomonosov Ridge; con-
firmation that it is continental shelf would lead to the median line
principIe giving rise to a demarcation line roughly prolonging the
midline oí the Ridge (46).
1.5. JAN MAYEN ISLAND.
(41) DOllOT: op. cit .• pp.156-164.
(42) SHUSTERICH: •.International... ", cit., pp.252,253. PHARAND: "The lega!....", cit., p. 76. The
Agreement betwecn Canada and Denmark can be consulted in Callada Trealy Series, 1984, N." 9.
(43) PHARAND: "The legal Regime of the Arctic: some standing issues", International journal,
XXIX, Autumn 1984. p. 752.
(44) VAN DER ESSEN:" les regions .." , cit., p.476.
The delimitation oí a fishing zone around the island of Jan
Mayen (373 km2), which forms part of the Kingdom of Norway
according to Section 1 of a Norwegian Act of February 27th 1930,
has been the subject of dispute between Norway and Iceland. In
February 1979, Norway announced its intention of enforcing an
exclusive economic zone around the island. This proposal was objected
to by Iceland (which is about 293 nautical miles from Jan Mayen)
(~5) PHARAND. "La souveraineté du Canada dans l' Arctique", Rt'VIIt' QlIdJl!wisl! ¡fí.' Dro;/ Illtenlll-
tiollal. 1986, p.290.
(46) ldem.: "The legal regime ... ", cil .• pp. 752. 753.
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on grounds that in 1982 were to become Art. 121 Para. 3 of the
Convention on the Law of the Sea: "Rocks which cannot sustain
human habitation or economic life of their own shall have no exclusive
economic zone or continental shelf" (47). Negotiations between the
governments of the two nations led to the signing, on May 28th 1980,
of an agreement that recognized the 200-mile zone around Jan Mayen
wherever this zone does not overlap the 200-mile zone around
Iceland, which is respected. The agreement also created a Joint
Fisheries Commission for the establishment of fishing quotas in the
area; this Commission was constituted on the day following the
signing of the Agreement (48).
Partition of the continental shelf between Jan Mayen and Ice-
land was encharged by Art. 9 of the Agreement to a Conciliation
Commission. The recommendations of this Commission were based
on a wide range of considerations including the strong economic
interest of Iceland in the area, geographical and geological factors
and other specíal circumstances, and led to the signing, on October
22nd 1981, of a Convention between Norway and Iceland, Art. 1 of
which establishes that in the region between Iceland and Jan Mayen
the frontier of their shelf jurisdictions coincides with that of their
exclusive economic zones. At the same time, the Convention pro-
vides for joint management of the shelf resources of Jan Mayen in
an area of 45,475 km2 (49).
(47) VAN DER ESSEN: "Les regions ...", cit., pp. 476-478. It may be pointed out, as Theutenberg has
done, that Ar!.l21 Para. 3 mentions only rocks, not islands or islets. Does this mean that islands or islets
of some size are not covered by Art.121 (which is entitled "Regime of islands")? The answer appears to
be difficult. In State practice there are examples 01 very small islands that are taken into account as points
of departure from which to measure the continental shelf or exclusive economic zone (THEUTENBERG:
op. cit., pp. 46, 47). Evensen has stressed thal Jan Mayen has no permanent population, since one could
hardly count as such the thirty or so state employees in charge of the radio and meteorological stations
and the Loran and Consol navegation stations (EVENSEN: "La delirnitation du plateau continental entre
la Norvége et Islande dans le secteur de Jan Mayen", A.F.D.I., XXVII, 1981, p.711). Concerning the
characteristics of Jan Mayen, see also VAN DYKE, J.N., MORGAN, J. R. and CURISH, J.: "The Exelusive
Economic Zone of Ihe Northwestern Hawaiian Islands: When Do Uninhabited Islands Generate an EEZ?",
San Diego Lnw Review, vol. 25, N." 3, 1988, p. 460.
(48) On the cantent of the Agrecment of May 28th 1980, see EVENSEN, op. cit., pp. 718-723, and
HEY, op. cit., pp. 165-168. The text may be consulted in Overerlskomster ... ,1980, p. 912.
(49) VAN DER ESSEN: "Les regions ...", cit., pp.476478. RICHARDSON, E.: "Jan Mayen in Perspec-
tive", Anlerican [ournal of I"tematiorwl Lnw, vo1.82, N." 3, 1988, pp. 443·448. According to l.aurscn, Ihe
reasons given by the Commission for its proposal inelude the utter dependence of lceland on imports of
petroleum derivatives, the poor potential of the lcelandic continental shelf as a source of petroleum and
the high risks assocíated with the developmcnt of the Jan Mayen Ridge, which may contain pctroleurn
(LAURSEN: op. cit, pp. 222·224). The Convention of October 22nd 1981 may be consulted in EVENSEN,
op. cit., pp. 736·738, and in Internatianal Legal Matcrials, XXI, November 1982, pp.1222-1226.
The delimitation of the fishing zone and continental shelf around
Jan Mayen is also the subject of a suit filed with the International
Court of Justice by Denmark against Norway. In this case the specific
.area in dispute is that separating Jan Mayen from the eastern coast
of Greenland (SO).
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1.6. THE aEAUFORT SEA.
The hydrocarbon potential of the Beaufort Sea has been known
since the discovery of the Prudhoe Bay deposits in 1968. Since then,
further prospection and exploitation has beenhalted by a demar-
cation dispute between the United States and Canada concerning an
area of 6,180 square nautical miles in the Diapir Basin, In this
dispute, the United States favours the equidistancy principIe, which
in view of the convexity of the adjacent North American coastline
would give it a greater share of the exploitable regions of the
continental shelf; Canada, on the other hand, invokes the sector
principIe in advocating a demarcation line based on the 141stmeridian
west of Greenwich. Though the mutual economic and political
dependence of the United States and Canada might be expected to
make them the ideal partners for participation in a joint development
mechanism, the unwillingness of the United States to lend weight
to the sector principIe may hinder compromise.
It may be pointed out that the creationof a joint development
area would not only be a practical solution allowing development
to take place, but would also excuse the United States from explain-
ing why it respects 1867 Convention on the cession of Alaska as
regards the maritime frontier laid down between the United States
and Russia in the west, while failing to recognize the frontier es-
tablished by the same Convention between the United States and
Canada in the east, the 141st meridian; cooperation along the lines
suggested above might serve as a precedent for an agreement between
the United States and the Soviet Union in the Bering Sea (51). Be
(50) Crónica ONU, voI.XXV, N.o 4, December 1988, p. 79.
(51) The Bering Sea, which 1ies to the south al the Arctic circle, is not geographicaJly an Arctic Sea.
For this reason, I refrain from commenting in detail on the dispute between the United States and the
Soviet Union concerning title to 15,000 square miles 01 potentially hydrocarbon-bearíng shelf in this sea.
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that as it may, it is necessary to stress the vital importance of
implementing procedures for cooperation in pollution control in
such a hydrocarbon-rich region as this (52).
2. THE ARCTIC AS COMMON HERITAGE OF MANKIND.
In this section 1 shall examine the desirability or otherwise of
declaring the Arctic to be Common Heritage of Mankind. 1 begin
by summarizingthe small amount of doctrine in this area. With
regard to the development of a regime for the region, Young wrote
that "we must begin by avoiding any temptation to compare the
Arctic wíth the Antarctic, assuming that regime formation will succeed
in the Arctic merely because it did in Antarctica. In fact, the two
polar regions are antipodes in terms of regime formation as well
as in geographical terms. In 1959, when the Antarctic Treaty was
signed, the various parts of Antarctica were not fully integrated into
the political systems of contiguous states. It is doubtful whether
those states advancing territorial claims in Antarctica could even
have met the standards of "effective occupancy" in any serious test
of their claims. The entire region was already demilitarized on a de
[acto basis. No industrial activities of any kind were taking place
on the Continent. And Antarctica was (as it still is) practically devoid
of any permanent human population. None ot these conditions ob-
tains today in the Arctic region. As a result, we must reckon not
only with the fact that the set of players involved in Arctic politics
is not the same as the set of players participating in Antarctic
politics. We must also grasp the fact that the interests, issues and
bargaining positions of the states likely to participa te in Arctic
regimes are different from those of the members of the Antarctic
Treaty" (53). Young is of course essentially right: an Arctic regime
The dispute arose lrom technical discrepandes regarding the way in which the dividing line
established by the 1867 Convention should be drawn; Russia uses the Rhumb-line Method and the United
States the Great Cirele Method. For lurther details, see ANTINORI, C.M.: "The Bering Sea: A Maritime
Delimitation Dispute Between the United States and the Soviet Unión", O.D./.L., vol.18, pp. 14 7 (p. 32
passim). .
(52) On questions 01 sovereígnty, the sector. principie and the problem ~f ice lormations, see, e.g.,
MARTlNEZ-PUNAL: "Los espacios polares: el Artico", Al/l/arIO de Derecho MaTltlmo, vol.VIII, pp.127-152.
(53) YOUNG, O.R.: '''Arctic Water': The Politics 01 Regime Formation", O.D.l.L., vol.l S, 1987, p. 102.
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must address the problems ansmg from the peculiarities of the
Arctic, and not mechanically copy the solution arrived at for the
Antarctic. Yet such similarities as do exist between the two cases
cannot be ignored. Until the early 20th century, most of the Arctic
was, like the Antarctic, terra nullius, a circumstance that gave rise
to a complex set of problems concerning claims to sovereignty; and
though these problems have largely been resolved, bringing all Arctic
lands under national sovereignty, the two regíons are still custom-
arily discussed together. This custom is probably partly due the
Arctic's having only relatively recently been deprived of its former
status of terra nullius, and because of the ignorance of or scant
attention to these questions by the doctrine of States that are not
directly involved in them, but it surely throws doubt on whether
the regimes being developed for the two regions, though admittedly
different one from the other, cannot or should not be considered
jointly. On what grounds must the traditional working methodology
be departed from? Would such a departure be advantageous in any
way? And where would it leave any common features of the two
regimes? If such common features exist, it would seem that their
joint examination must be beneficiaI for their elucidation; it is not
impossible that they may grow in number and scope_ Thus it is my
belief that the arguments in favour of considering the Antarctic as
the Common Heritage of Mankind, though they cannot be used as
the basis of similar theses for the Arctic, may nevertheless play a
legitimate role in stimulating theses of this kind, and should accord-
ingly not be banished from consideration.
Withthe Antarctic thus not totally out of mind, let us examine
the case of the Arctic, where, as we have seen, the general estab-
lishment of excIusive economic zones and national continental shelves
has been carried out by the coastal States. Art, 1 Para. 1 of the
Convention on the Law of the Sea states that for the purposes of
this Convention, '"Area' means the seabed and ocean floor and
subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of national jurisdiction". The limits
of the international seabed and ocean floor Area are thus defined
by those of the national continental shelves. In the Arctic, this means
that the international Area is located, in accordance with Art, 76
Para. 5 of the Convention, 350 nautical miles from the coastal baselines
or 100 nautical miles from the 2, 500-metre isobath (the line con-
necting points 2, 500 metres deep). This is a relatively small, per-
manently ice-covered area around the North Pole. The Arctic High
Sea is a larger area; it is subject to Part VII of the Convention,
including the provisions concerning freedom of navigation. This
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latter remark is not as divorced from reality as mightappear, since
a) the ice covering most of this region consists of relatively -thin,
drifting floes that when broken up by an icebreaker do not prevent
navigation, and b) the Arctic High Sea almost everywhere has a
depth of at ieast 500 metres - and in many places between 2,200
and 4,500 metres - which allows navigation bysubmarines (54).
Beyond the continental shelves and exclusive economic zones. there
are thus two legal areas: the sea bottom located outside national
jurisdiction, and the High Sea.
The seabed and ocean floor is part of what the Convention on
the Law of the Sea calls the "Area". The Area is the subject of Part
XI of the Convention, within which Art. 136 states that "the Area
and its resources are the common heritage ot mankind" (55). Thus
the Arctic seabed and ocean floor beyond national jurisdiction, as
part of the Area, belong to the common heritage of mankind. Art.
137 of the Convention establishes in Para. 1that "No State shall claim
or exercise sovereignty or sovereign rights over any part of the Area
or its resources, nor shall any State or natural or juridical person
appropriate any part thereof. No such claim or exercise of sover-
eignty orsovereign rights nor such appropriation shall be recog-
nized". Besides Arts. 136 and 137, a11other provisions concerning
the Area are likewise applicable to the Arctic seabed and otean floor,
though their practical effects would depend on the presence and
quantity of resources present. Rodriguez-Carrion is therefore quite
right when he writes that "the Arctic Ocean is almost unanimously
considered as high sea subject to the regime corresponding to this
kind of marine area, and since the III Conference on the Law of the
Sea its floorand subsoil fall within -the International Seabed and
Ocean Floor Area" (56).
With regard to the Arctic High Sea, considered without refer-
ence to its ecological context, the only respect in which the Arctic
(54) VAN DER ESSEN: "Les regions ... , cit., p. 479.
(55) Similarly, Paragraph 1 01 U.N. Resolution 2749 (XXV) eontaining the Declaration 01 PrincipIes
Governing the Sea-Bed and the Oeean Floor, and the Subsoil Thereof, beyond the Limits 01 National
jurisdietion, states thal "The seabed and oeean floor, and the subsoil thereof, beyond the limits 01 national
jurisdietion (hereinafter referred lo as the Area). as well as the resourees 01 Ihe Area, are the eommon
heritage 01 mankind",
(56) RODRIGUEZ-CARRION, A.j.: Lecciones de Derecho Inlemaciollal P,íblico, 2nd Ed., Madrid, 1990,
pp. 442, 443; our Iranslation. Likewise in lavour 01 subjeeling Ihe seabed and oeean flo~,r ,10 the Area
regime is CAFLlSCH: op. cil., p.60. See also PHARAND, The Legal..., ClI., pp. 77, 78 and L Arenque el
l' Anlarelique: Palrimoine Commun de l'Humanite", Alllwls of Air and Space Law, vol.Vll, 1982, pp.415-430,
and THEUTENBERG, op. cü., p.60.
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Ocean differs from any other ocean is the presence of ice floes on
its surface. Like other oceans it offers the freedom of the sea, in
particular freedom of navigation, a right that is in fact increasingly
made use of. Other freedoms of the sea that are exercised include
freedom of overflight, freedom of fishing and freedom of scientific
research, and increasing knowledge of the seabed and technological
advances have likewise made it possible to lay submarine cables and
pipelines. In Pharand's words, "In these circumstances, the water
of the Ocean must be considered as high seas, as any other ocean" (57).
At the same time, however.
The Arctic is unique in many respects and is of great importance
for the understanding of our environment. Its is a rare, so-called
zero area: an area where, without the disruption of po11ution, we
can sti11100k back thousands of years on out own chain oí devel-
opment. The Arctic countries have a great responsibility for preserv-
ing this last retrospective mirror, ín-large ecologica11y untouched,
and to prevent po11ution from reaching the region. The risk of
pollution is increasing as more oil rigs and other tools of technology
approach the Arctic region. The conditions in the Arctic are signifi-
cant for our own daily environment. Initiatives ought to be taken
in order to protect the environment of the Arctic region and to
preserve the Arctic fauna (58).
It is thus of the utmost importance to conserve the pristine
conditions of the Arctic environment. However, while recognizing
the need for Arctic nations to take appropriate measures in the
marine areas under their jurisdiction, I would disagree with forecasts
like Theutenberg's:
The development of the law of the sea and the establishment of
the new sovereignty zones therefore has an importan-t poJitical and
military/strategic bearing) on the Arctic in the longer perspectives.
Areas which were quite free and could be reached without legal
difficulties only a decade ago are now under national control in one
(57) PHARAND: "The Legal Status of Ihe Artic Regions, Recueil des Cours, T. 163, 1979-11, p. 84
and "The Law ... ", pp. 176, 177. Butler noted thal "insofar as the water and ice areas of the Aretie are
concerned, the regime 01 high seas is operative as a matter of positive law" (BUTLER, W.E.: Northeast
Are/ic Passage, Alphen aan den Rijn, 1978, p. 77); while Pastor-Ridrue]o asserted: "Einally, wilh rcgard lo
the Arelie Oeean sellsu suiao, it must be considered legally as high sea, and hence as governed by the
principIe 01 freedom" (PASTOR-RIDRUEjO: Curso ..., cit., pp. 461: 462; our translation),
(58) THEUTENBERG: op. cit., p.55.
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respect or another. Looking at a map of the Arctic and the Norwegian
Sea, with the new zones inserted, it is evident that most of the Arctic
will in the future be under national control - for the time being only
as regards economic exploitation, but possibly in other respects in
times to come. This is a useful reminder of the concept of "creeping
[urísdiction". (59)
The establishment of the exclusive economic zone concept -
which 1 have had occasion to express my approval of (60) - does
not, to my mind, justify jurisdiction creeping further out to sea, and
1 accordingly consider it to be unlikely that Arctic States could be
recognized as having environmental powers outside their shelf
jurisdiction and exclusive economic zones, except for such powers
as might derive from the Convention under Arts. 117 (Duty of States
to adoptwith respect to their nationals measures for the conservation
of the living resources of the high seas), 118 (Co-operation of States
in the conservation and management of living resources) and 119
(Conservation of the living resources of the high seas). It may be
pointed out, moreover, that, at least in ,theory, it would be possible
for conflict to arise between measures taken by coastal States and
any mea sures taken by the Authoritv of the Area under Art. 145
of the Convention (Protection of the marine environment).
My misgivings with respect to creeping jurisdiction do not, of
course, imply that 1 am in favour of "lawless" situations in which
nonfulfilment of obligations under the Convention of the Law of the
Sea is allowed to come about through their reduction to mere norms
of behaviour; rather, I have advocated the design of international
mechanisms able to lead towards the solution of critical situations
arising from the lack of institutional structures capable of responding
(59) THEUTENBERG: op. cü., p.4ñ.
(60) PUEYO·LOSA, J.A, and MARTINEZ·PUÑAL, A,: La adminislración de los recursos biológicos
mar;,lOs al/le el Nuevo Ordel/ /uridico·Marílimo II/Ie",aciol/al, III Congreso Iberoameric~no del Medio Ambiente,
Santiago de Compostela, [une 23·29th 1981, La Coruña, 1982. MARTINEZ.PUN-:"L:, Los derecho,s"" ~'I,;
"Reflexiones sobre los intereses pesqueros españoles y los derechos de los Estados Sin htoral y en situacíon
geografica desventajosa en los recursos vivos de las zonas economicas exclusivas de otros Estados",
índusírías Pcsqueras, N." 1422, pp, 13·15 and N,· 1423, pp, 11-14; "Los derech.os de los Estados sin Ht?r~1
y en situacion geografica desventajosa en la zona econorruca exclusiva: el ambl~o ~e la partlCI~aclo~ ,
Alluario de Derecho Marílimo, V, 1986, pp. 97-154; "Los derechos de los Extados Sin htoral y en situacron
Geográfica desventajosa en la Zona Economica Exclusiva: fundamentación y Nuevo Orde~ Economico
Internacional". AI/uario Mexical/o de Re/aciol/es 1I//t'rImciollales, 1986, pp. 321-335; "La zona econormca exclusiva:
valorizacion de sus razones de oportunidad (con consideración particular del caso azoriano)", in 8 Semana
da, Pescas ,1,>, A(,,,,,s, Rt'lalóri", pp, 71-78 (also published in. A.D,M .. vol. 111.pp, 257-284).
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adequately to a profoundly interdependent international reality (61),
In particular, one might wonder whether it would be desirable to
declare, in some appropriate international instrument, that the Arctic
High Sea, like the Arctic Area, is part of the Common Heritage of
Mankind. In this event, the greater area of the high sea zone would
resu1t in Common Heritage water lying not only over Common
Heritage ocean floor but also over national continental shelf. This
is a bold hypothesis, for judging the feasibility of which there are
perhaps as yet too few points of reference, but it is not an arbitrary
one; in the framework of the UNESCO World Heritage Programme
it has already been suggested that Lancaster Sound be designated
a World Heritage Area, a category designed to protect areas of major
ecological importance (62).
The Arctic Common Heritage of Mankind, be it limited to the
Arctic Area or include the Arctic High Sea, should be understood
as defined essentially for its protection in the spirit of Art. 145 of
the Convention on the Law of the Sea though without ruling out
such possible exploitation as the fragile nature of the Arctic might
allow. The declaration of the Arctic High Sea as part of the Common
Heritage would forestal! any tendency on the part of Arctic States
to seek the gradual extension of their jurisdiction towards the North
Pole, a tendency that would be fuel!ed by interpretations contrary
to the proper understanding of the Arctic seabed beyond national
jurisdiction as part of the International Seabed Area, or of the Arctic
High Sea as high sea. Such a declaration would incidentally constitu-
te a further step in the progressive socialization of the high seas
in general.
(61) 'MARTINEZ-PUÑAL: "Sobre un Nuevo Orden Politico Internacional: Elementos", Pactos &
ldeías, IV, N."',6-7, pp, 51-82 (also published in Problemas de la Ciencia [uridica. Estudios ell IIomella;<, al Prof.
Fralleisco P"y Mlllioz, Vol.ll, Universidad de Santiago de Compostela, 1991. pp. 493-514),
(62) PHARAND: The Nortlnoest Passage Arctic Stmits, Dordrecht. 1984, p.124, The hypothesis I put
forward is in fact no! unimbued by the philosophy that leads Fleischer to write of "biological resources
qua common heritage of mankind" (FLEISCHER: "La peche", Traile"., cit., pp, 846, 955 and 956) and
Rodriguez-Carrión to deal with the high sea, the International Seabed Arca, the Arctic and Antarctic polar
regions and outer space all in a single lesson entitled "Regions that are Common Heritage of Mankind"
(RODRIGUEZ-CARRION: op, cit., pp. 432-455), The need for "special considera!ion and perbaps special
legal arrangements" in the Arctic on account 01 its special environmental characteristics. among others. is
discussed by GLASSNER, M, ),: Ncpiune's Domaiu, A Politica! ICeosral'hy o[ lile Sea. Boston, 1990, pp, 97, 98,
On the environmental background, see STONEHOUSE, Il, (EdJ: TI,,' Arclic alld P"II11litm, Cambndge. 1986,
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My approach to the Arctic is thus close to that of Sucharitkul,
who in discussing the future of the concept of a Common Heritage
ot Mankind wrote the following:
"What, then, will be the place of the concept ofcommon heritage
of mankind in tomorrow's internationallaw? The future of this concept
depends on the capacity of mankind, as an institution, to adapt, to
balance the various interests, to order them in a way that is just and
beneficial for all, and to discern the proper precedence and priority
of each while maintaining a sufficient flexibility and spirit of com-
promise in the general interest of the whole of mankind. In turn, States
must protect their vital and special interests, watching over and protecting
the specific interests of their citizens and of agents acting on their
behalf. However, in the last analysis, it is the general interest of
mankind that should prevail.
oo. On this Earth there are patches of territory that belong to no-
one, to no particular State, but which serve the whole world and are
thus the common property of all mankind. They include, for example,
the upper atmosphere around the Earth, the Earth's stratosphere and
ionosphere, the Earth's core, axis, depths or interior, the glaciers or
glacial terrítories in the polar regions of the north and south of the Eartn
(in spite of certain claims), the seabed beyoñd national jurisdiction, the
high seas, the airspace above the high seas and oceans." (63)
To conclude, 1 should like to stress that the thesis put forward
in this article does not rule out the possibility that the institutional
system that might eventually be adopted to govern the Arctic might
afford recognition to the special situation of Arctic nations. With or
without any declaration of the Arctic as belonging to the Common
Heritage of Mankind, the desirability of there existing mechanisms
for mutual understanding has been has been emphasized by Pharand:
"It therefore, in ttle first place, pertains to these Arctic States to
proceed with their scientific research, and if this research should reveal
the existence of mineral resources in the international zone susceptible
to exploitation, their collaboration will be an essential requisite for
such exploitation. There might then be an agreement between, on the
one part, the Arctic States and, on the other, the international deep
seabed authority, for the establishment of a particular legal regime
concerning the exploitation of these resources." (64).
ANTONIO MARTÍNEZ PUÑAL
Professor de Direito Internacional
Universidad e de Santiago de Compostela
(63) SUCHARITKUL, s.: "Evolution continue d'une notion nouvelle: le patrimoine commun de
l'humanité", El Derecho y el Mar, cit., pp. 279, 280 (our translation and italics), 1 would point out that the
Common Heritage hypothesis, among others, was also considered by Friedheim, who in diseussing the
regime of the Aretie wrote that "systems of governanee might range from virtually no governance at all
at one end 01 the spectrum, to some form of eollective governance at the other, such as the Common
Heritage 01 Mankind" (FRIEDHEIM, R.L.: "The Regime 01 the Aretie - Distributional or lntegrative
Bargaining", O.D.J.L" vol.19, N.O 6, 1988, p. 493).
(64) PHARAND: "L'Arctique ...", cit., pp. 420,421; our translation. For a view of the geographical,
eeonomic and strategie background of the legal regimes 01 navigation through Aretic straits and the
environmental protection 01 the Aretic, see, illter alias, MARTlNEZ-I'UÑAL: "Los espacios polares ...", cit.,
pp. 127-152.
